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Human smuggling is a form of illegal trade in which the commodity is an assisted 
illegal entry into a country. While this is hardly a new phenomenon, evidence points 
to an increased involvement of smugglers in facilitating these journeys. This has been 
linked to the hardening of entry policies in developed countries. Smuggling markets 
tend to possess low barriers to entry and remarkably similar organizational 
arrangements in all the main smuggling routes in the World: no monopolies and 
small, localized, and rudimentary hierarchies. There are clear separations between 
migrant smugglers and their protectors and between migrant smugglers and drug 
traffickers. The limited empirical evidence suggests that, rather than being involved in 
other unrelated criminal activities, smugglers often run small-scale legitimate 
businesses. There is very little evidence of direct involvement of traditional Mafia-
like organizations. Finally, smugglers, often in competition to attract migrants, have 
developed diverse strategies to foster transactions, including investing in their 
reputations, offering warranties, and bringing in third-party escrow services. Recent 
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Human smuggling, also commonly referred to as “migrant smuggling” or “people 
smuggling,” was internationally defined by article 2 of the UN Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, adopted by the General Assembly in 
November 2000, as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of 
which the person is not a national or a permanent resident.”. As of May 2019, 112 
countries have signed the protocol and made human smuggling a criminal offense. 
While national legislation differs in the wording of the offense, the UN definition is 
the gold standard around which all are modelled (Gallagher and David 2014).  
 
The smuggling for profit of migrants across countries in the absence of a legal right to 
movement is hardly a new phenomenon (Kyle and Koslowski 2011). For instance, in 
the 17th and 18th centuries, migration from (modern) Germany – and Central Europe 
more generally – to North America was sometimes facilitated by smugglers who 
operated in ways that echo contemporary smuggling stories (Wokeck 1999; O’Reilly 
forthcoming). However, while in the past smugglers were mostly needed to exit one’s 
country, contemporary smuggling is mostly concerned with providing illegal entry 
into a country (with a few exceptions, notably Eritrea and North Korea, or Syria 
during the civil war). This is reflected in the 2000 UN definition which makes an 
explicit reference to the absence of “necessary requirements for legal entry into the 
receiving State” (Article 3, subsection c). Since its adoption, there has been a growth 
in the concern of governments about human smuggling and all of the major 
destinations of migration flows—the US, Europe, and Australia—have declared a 
“migration crisis” at some point. The hardening of entry policies in nearly all 
developed countries has made the reliance on smugglers more and more acute (see 
Massey, Durand and Pren 2016: 1576 for an empirical test using US data; also 
Ayalew Mengiste 2018: 58).  
 
Analytically, we can think of human smuggling as a market in which the commodity 
traded is the assisted illegal entry into a country for a profit (Bilger et al 2006; 
Kleemans 2011; Campana and Varese 2016).1 Markets, by definition, are 
                                               
1 This paper focuses on smuggling seen as the assisted illegal entry of migrants, thereby 
emphasising activities related to the actual movement of people (this is in line, alas, with 
Article 3 and Article 6, subparagraph 1a of the UN Protocol). However, it should be noted 
that the UN Protocol also criminalises activities “enabling a person who is not a national or a 
permanent resident to remain in the State concerned without complying with the necessary 
requirements for legally remaining in the State” (Article 6, subparagraph 1c). The latter set of 
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characterized by supply and demand. In this instance, migrants constitute the demand-
side of the market. They are willing to buy a service, that is illegal entry into a 
country, for reasons that include leaving war zones, extreme poverty, economic 
hardship, or persecution (Robinson and Segrott 2002; Antonopoulos and Winterdyk 
2006; Yildiz 2017; Optimity Advisors and Seefar 2018). The demand for smuggling 
services is satisfied by a number of sellers. In this market, they are characterized as 
smugglers. Based on their route and ethnicity or nationality, smugglers might be 
referred to by different names, for instance snakeheads in the case of Chinese 
smuggling (Chin 1999; Zhang and Chin 2002; Zhang, 2008); coyotes or polleros2 
along the Mexican route to the US (Izcara Palacios 2014; Sanchez 2015); muharrib 
among Syrians (Achilli 2018: 87); passeur in West Africa (Maher 2018); and 
delaloch among Amharic-speaking Eritreans and Ethiopians (Ayalew Mengiste 2018: 
69).  
 
Human smuggling is primarily an offense against a state. When everything goes well 
in the smuggling process—namely, the smuggler keeps his promise and the migrant 
safely reaches the chosen destination—the only victim is the state that has seen its 
borders and its right to exercise control over a given territory violated. In contrast, 
human trafficking is primarily an offense against an individual (human trafficking 
involves control over a person for the purpose of exploitation: Campana and Varese 
2016). An illegal entry into a country may occur, but it is an ancillary element and not 
a constitutive one (Campana and Varese 2016). The two terms are often erroneously 
used interchangeably in the media coverage and public discourse, leading to 
confusion and thus hindering our ability to grasp either phenomenon fully and 
develop effective policies.  
 
However, while there are cases in which a journey started as smuggling and turns into 
trafficking (“failures of smuggling” as conceptualised in Campana and Varese 2016) 
or cases in which a trafficker poses as a smuggler to trick a potential victim, by and 
large the empirical evidence supports the analytical distinction between smuggling 
and trafficking. Fieldwork has shown that migrants act as buyers of services: they 
collect information; they make decisions about which smugglers to choose; and in 
some instances they have shown negotiating power in relation to prices and 
warranties (Optimity Advisors 2015: 36; Maher 2018: 40). Smugglers too behave in 
ways that suggest a market for services rather than coercive trafficking situations, 
from price segmentation based on the quality of service (Optimity Advisors 2015: 
                                               
activities relates to the “illegal stay” of a migrant rather than the “illegal entry/movement”, 
and they are outside the scope of this paper.  
2 Izcara Palacios (2014: 325-326) notes that the term coyote is the most frequently used and 
can be traced back to the 1920s; the term pollero is more recent. Theyare often used 
interchangeably.   
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108-109) to a host of different guarantees (Section IV). The behavior of the market 
for smuggling services appears to follow the law of demand and supply. For instance, 
the price for an “assisted” journey from Greece to Serbia went up from €500 in 2012 
to €2,000 (roughly equivalent to US $560 to 2,200) mainly due to higher demand and 
a “slight increase in risk” experienced by smugglers (Optimity Advisors 2015: 43). In 
other instances, an increase in supply has brought prices down as in Libya in 2015 
(Kingsley 2015).  
 
This is not to say that migrants might not face risky situations and violence or, indeed, 
that smugglers always act reliably and honestly. According to the Missing Migrant 
Project of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), at least 3,318 migrants 
lost their lives in 2019 worldwide.3 Since the records began in 2014, a total of at least 
34,477 migrant fatalities have been recorded by IOM, with the year 2016 as the 
deadliest on record (8,070 fatalities; the yearly average for the period 2014-2019 is 
5,746). The Mediterranean route constantly ranks as the deadliest, e.g. it accounted 
for 64% of all fatalities in 2016. This is likely to be the result of both a heightened 
risk due to the sea crossing (see also Section V) and to an improved data collection in 
this sector (data for the fatalities in the Libyan desert are arguably of lesser quality). 
The number of deaths recorded by IOM at the US Mexico-Border was 2,336 for the 
entire period 2014-2019, with a yearly average of 389 fatalities (the year 2018 was the 
deadliest on record with 442 fatalities). The IOM also provides estimates for the 
mortality rate per attempted crossings for the entire Mediterranean sector: this 
includes sea arrivals in Spain, Italy, Cyprus and Greece, land arrivals in Spain and 
interceptions by the Tunisian National Guard and the Turkish and the Libyan Coast 
Guard. According to IOM, such proportion of deaths vs. crossings was 1.4% for the 
year 2018 and 0.7% for 2017 (see also Section V for an estimation of the mortality 
rate for the Central Mediterranean route). Besides the loss of their lives, migrants 
might also face exploitation while en route. Using a post-deportation survey 
conducted in Mexico with 655 migrants who used the services of smugglers and were 
apprehended by US authorities, Slack and Martinez (2018: 153) documented 42 
instances of people being held by coyotes often following a steep increase in the 
originally-agreed fee or by individuals posing as smugglers.4 This translates into a 
non-negligible 6% chance of being exploited. Of the 1,602 who have arrived in Italy 
from Libya and interviewed by IOM in 2017, 36% declared to have been forced to 
                                               
3 Data from https://missingmigrants.iom.int/ 
4 Slack and Martinez (2018: 159-160) used data from the second wave of the Migrant Border 
Crossing Study. The sample frame included individuals 18 years of age or older who had 
been apprehended by any US authority and repatriated to Mexico. Participants were randomly 
selected using a spatial sampling technique and then interviewed face-to-face (response rate 
94 percent).   
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work or perform activities against their will (Brian 2017: 9; it is not specified whether 
this happened at the hands of smugglers or by other actors).  
 
The complexity of the phenomenon – and often its contradictions – emerges neatly 
from the same post-deportation survey conducted in Mexico, in which 75 percent of 
the migrants reported being satisfied with the services provided by the smugglers 
(Slack and Martinez 2018: 153).5 In interviews with migrants along one of the most 
perilous migrant routes from Ethiopia to Europe crossing through Sudan and the 
Libyan desert, smugglers were “repeatedly described as supportive and protective by 
migrants. Delaloch are consistently described as saviors”, thus running contrary to 
“perceptions of smugglers as exploitative or violent” (Ayalew Mengiste 2018: 71).  
Achilli (2018) makes a similar point in relation to smuggling across the Eastern 
Mediterranean. A Syrian refugee has described smugglers as “neither good nor evil. 
You pay for a service and you get what you pay for” (quoted in Achilli 2018: 83). 
Often, exploitation is a consequence of the undocumented status of a migrant rather 
than a direct consequence of smugglers’ action (Campana and Varese 2016; Achilli 
2018: 79). Additionally, the cost of smuggling services can place migrants in a debt 
situation, thus making them vulnerable to accept exploitative working conditions 
during or after the journey, potentially leading to situations of labour, sexual or 
criminal exploitation. When analysing such cases, it is crucial to tease out the exact 
role played a smuggler – and whether he or she is directly involved in such 
exploitation.  
 
This essay proceeds as follows: the first section discusses issues related to the 
measurement of human smuggling and offers an assessment of two major routes for 
which we have the best evidence base (into the European Union and the United 
States). Section II surveys what is known about the organization of smuggling 
activities in relation to a number of international routes. Section III discusses the 
relationship between human smuggling and other illegal activities, particularly drug 
trafficking and protection. Section IV looks at the ways smugglers foster transactions 
in the smuggling market and overcome the acute trust problem that characterizes such 
markets. Section V presents a brief assessment of policy responses. Section VI 
concludes.  
 
[IN A BOX HERE:] 
 
Human Smuggling: A Summary of the Evidence 
 
                                               
5 Smugglers can also be at the receiving end of violence, including one murder documented 
by Slack and Martinez (2018) in which migrants decapitated their smuggler with a machete 
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• Smuggling markets show remarkably similar features across the World; 
• Such markets generally involve little violence among smugglers;  
• Smuggling groups are usually small and generally composed of individuals 
who are not otherwise criminal;  
• There is little overlap between drug and human smuggling;  
• There is little or limited organized crime (Mafia-type) direct involvement in 
human smuggling; 
• There is an important – and often neglected - distinction between smugglers 
and protectors;  
• The market for smuggling services possesses many features normally 
associated to legal markets, including competition and the importance of 




I. Assessing the extent of human smuggling 
 
Despite the existence of a commonly agreed legal definition of human smuggling, our 
empirical knowledge about the phenomenon is, to put it mildly, very patchy. There is 
no global estimate of the extent of human smuggling, and only a minority of countries 
regularly produce statistics on the phenomenon (McAuliffe and Laczko 2016: 10). 
Reliable statistics are difficult to compile for a number of reasons. Firstly, as human 
smuggling takes place under a condition of illegality, both smugglers and migrants 
have a strong incentive not to leave traces. Similarly, states too may have an incentive 
not to collect or divulge such data if, for instance, they believe that migrants are only 
passing through their territory. Transit countries might have an incentive to allow an 
efficient “underground” system of smugglers rather than run the risk of turning into a 
“bottleneck” along a longer smuggling route. Some States might lack the capacity and 
resources to collect data on smuggling altogether – this is particularly true for States 
with weak institutions and porous borders. Furthermore, some States might decide not 
to make such data publicly available for both political and security reasons.  Australia, 
for instance, introduced restrictions on the release on information following the 
launch of a military-led anti-smuggling operation in 2013 (Gallagher and McAuliffe 
2016: 223).  
 
Some countries might report aggregate data on irregular migration rather than human 
smuggling. However, not all the cases of irregular migration involve the assistance of 
a smuggler (people can cross borders alone or they can enter a county legally and then 
overstay the terms of their visa). Migrants who are regularly living in a country at the 
time of the data collection, for instance following a regularization process, might have 
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used the service of a smuggler in the past. In other cases, the number of asylum 
applications may be used as a proxy for smuggling. However, not all asylum seekers 
have necessarily used a smuggler to reach the country where the application has been 
lodged, nor have all of the smuggled individuals necessarily lodged an asylum 
application.  
 
The official data available on human smuggling tend to be produced by law 
enforcement agencies, particularly border control agencies, and usually record 
detected illegal border crossings (IBCs) and come with a number of limitations. 
Firstly, statistics normally refer to crossings rather than to individuals. If the 
smuggling process extends across multiple countries, there is a concrete risk of 
double-counting the same individuals. Equally, in case of multiple interceptions, the 
same individual is counted multiple times. Official statistics can also under-represent 
the phenomenon since they do not include crossings that and migrants who are not 
detected. This makes it difficult, for instance, to take into account instances in which a 
journey has resulted in deaths6. Furthermore, not all illegal border crossings are 
necessarily made with the assistance of a smuggler, and there is variation in the use of 
smugglers depending on the route. Finally, statistics might be influenced by changes 
in the level of policing rather than changes in the actual phenomenon. Yet, 
notwithstanding their limitations, law enforcement statistics often constitute the best, 
and sometimes the only, source of data available.  
 
Given the large differences in the ability of law enforcement authorities—and the 
ability of States more generally—in collecting data on illegal border crossings and in 
their willingness to make them public, it is best to resist the temptation of attempting 
any global estimate of human smuggling. Rather, individual routes or even sub-routes 
are preferable as a macro unit of analysis. At present, our best evidence base relates to 
routes into the European Union and the United States.  
 
A. Smuggling into the European Union 
 
Over the years, European Union (EU) member states have increased their coordinated 
law enforcement response to human smuggling, including through the establishment 
of a dedicated Anti-Smuggling Centre within Europol (2017) and a common Border 
and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). Table 1 presents the yearly illegal border 
crossings into the EU detected since 2010 in relation to the three major routes7 of 
                                               
6 Some ad hoc projects, such as the Missing Migrant Project of the International Organization for 
Migration try to address this issue; https://missingmigrants.iom.int/. 
7 The remaining routes in the European Union record negligible figures. For examples, in 
2018, 1,084 illegal border crossings were recorded for the entire Eastern Borders Route, 
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entry: the Western Mediterranean Route (from North Africa to Spain); the Central 
Mediterranean Route (from North Africa to Italy and Malta); the Eastern 
Mediterranean Route (mostly from Turkey to Greece).8  
 
Table 1. Illegal border crossings into the European Union, 2010-2018 (major routes) 
  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
Eastern 
Med 55,688 57,025 37,224 24,799 50,834 885,386 182,277 42,305 56,561 
Central 
Med 4,450 64,261 15,151 45,298 170,664 153,946 181,376 118,962 23,485 
Western 
Med 5,003 8,448 6,397 6,838 7,842 7,164 9,990 23,143 57,034 
Total 65,141 129,734 58,772 76,935 229,340 1,046,496 373,643 184,410 137,080 
Source: Frontex (various years) 
 
How many of these IBCs have involved smugglers? It is safe to assume that journeys 
that include a sea crossing are likely to have been facilitated by smugglers. In 2017, 
93 percent of IBCs on the Western Mediterranean Route, 82 percent on the Eastern 
Mediterranean, and 100 percent on the Central Mediterranean involved a sea crossing 
(Frontex 2018: 43). The following year, 98 percent of the IBCs on the Western 
Mediterranean route, 60 percent of those on the Eastern Mediterranean, and all the 
Central Mediterranean ones involved crossing a sea (Frontex 2019: 43). Land 
crossings can be made with or without a smuggler, but given the heightened border 
controls, a conservative estimate would be that two-thirds of crossings were made 
with the assistance of a smuggler. Averaging across the two years, we can thus 
estimate that over 98 percent of the West Mediterranean crossings can be attributed to 
smugglers; over 90 percent of the Eastern Mediterranean crossings, and all of the 
Central Mediterranean ones.  
  
Frontex also provides some figures on the number of “facilitators” identified in any 
given year. These figures need to be taken with extreme caution as they conflate 
people with different roles in facilitating irregular entry into the EU, including those 
involved in the production of counterfeit documents, and they are likely to grossly 
underestimate the number of smugglers operating outside the EU. According to 
Frontex (2018: 46 and 2019: 44), the number of facilitators has hovered around ten 
thousand for the last five years: 10,234 (2014); 12,023 (2015); 12,621 (2016); 10,246 
(2017) and 10,642 (2018).  
 
                                               
1,051 for the West African Route (i.e. from Senegal to Canary Islands, Spain) and zero for the 
Black Sea Route (Frontex 2019: 16).   
8 This route is perhaps better defined as the “Aegean Route”.  
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B. Smuggling into the United States 
 
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) produces annual reports on a 
number of metrics related to the illegal entry of migrants (“aliens” in US statutory 
language). Table 2 presents the number of apprehensions, or illegal border crossings 
detected by law enforcement authorities, at the Southwest Border between the US and 
Mexico spanning across Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California during the last 
ten fiscal years available. Similarly to Frontex, these data are event-based and not 
person-based, meaning they do not represent a count of (unique) individuals 
apprehended at the border (DHS 2018: 18).  
 
Table 2. US Southwest Border Apprehension by Sector, FY 2007 - 2017  
 
 
Source: DHS (2019: 121) 
 
How many IBCs involved smugglers? DHS (2019) provides estimates based on 
surveys with apprehended migrants conducted by the Office for Migration Statistics 
and the US Border Patrol. The Office for Migration Statistics also estimate a constant 
increase in the rate of smuggler usage: from 40-50 percent in the 1970s to 95 percent 
in 2006 (DHS 2018: 48). Similarly, US Border Patrol interviews have estimated a 
smuggler “usage rate” between 80 and 95 percent among migrants apprehended in 
2015, in clear contrast to the situation pre-2001 when “relatively few illegal border 
crossers hired a smuggler” (DHS 2018: 48). Data from the Mexican Migration Project 
at Princeton University point to a similar level of smuggler involvement (close to 90 
percent in 2017: Sanchez 2018: 153).  
 
Table 3. US Southwest Border Apprehensions by Citizenship, FY 2008-2016 
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Source: DHS (2018: 46)  
 
Over the years, the composition of the nationality of migrants has changed 
substantially with a constant decline of migrants holding Mexican citizenship (Table 
3). In Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 migrants with Mexican citizenship constituted 93 
percent of the total; this fell to 46 percent in FY 2016 (see also DHS 2018: 146).  
 
Overall, the yearly trends for the EU pointed to an ability of smuggling markets to 
expand quickly and to a considerable degree – most likely following an increase in 
the demand for such services (Campana 2017). IBCs on the Eastern Mediterranean 
route increased by 1,641 percent between 2014 and 2015; the Central Mediterranean 
route by increases of 99 percent between 2012 and 2013 and 277 percent in 2013-14. 
Between 2010 and 2011, the same route had registered a 1,344 percent increase 
(Campana 2017). Data from the US suggest more stability, perhaps an indication of a 
more “mature” market. Occasionally, however, same sectors experienced steep 
increases (for example Rio Grande Valley, Texas) where the number of crossings 
increased 4.3 times between 2011 and 2014. These rates of increase suggest that the 
barriers to entry and the level of resources required for an actor to successfully enter 
the market – or for an existing actor to expand their operation – are likely to be rather 
low (see Campana 2017 for a further discussion on this point). Empirical evidence 
from China, Turkey, Mexico, and Niger supports this point (Zhang and Chin 2002; 
Spener 2009; Demir, Sever and Kahya 2017; Campana 2017; Brachet 2018).  
 
 
II. The structure of human smuggling  
 
How are smuggling activities organized? To answer this question, I turn to the 
evidence available in relation to some of the main smuggling routes.  
 
A.  Organizational arrangements along four main routes 
 
Chinese smuggling in the US and Europe. Some of the earlier works on human 
smuggling carried out by criminologists investigated the structure of smuggling 
operations between China and the US in the late 1990s. The work of Ko-lin Chin and 
Sheldon Zhang, both independently and jointly, has given insight into Chinese-
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American smuggling operations through interviews with individuals directly involved 
in smuggling migrants (Chin 1999; Zhang and Chin 2002; Zhang 2008). They noted 
that Chinese human smuggling organizations differ in their structure from the 
traditional Triads, as the former “are made up of decentralized associations of 
criminals of diverse backgrounds, and the relationships among core members are 
mostly horizontal” (Zhang and Chin 2002: 759; also Chin 1999). 
 
Interactions tend to take place within small groups, with each group focused on a 
specific set of tasks (Zhang 2008: 145). Zhang and Chin describe the network of 
smugglers as a “task force, committed to one task or one operation at a time—that is, 
to deliver their clients to their destiny and get paid” (Zhang and Chin 2002: 750). 
These task forces, they add, tend to be rather small in number with a core group of 
generally three or four individuals brought together purely by business arrangements. 
Chin (1999: 41) observed that smuggling of Chinese migrants was carried out by 
groups “working independently, each with its own organization, connections, 
methods and routes. […] No one of these groups, however, dominates or monopolizes 
the lucrative trade”. Smugglers often have an history of previous social interactions, 
for example thorough their family networks or businesses dealings (Zhang and Chin 
2002: 750). Speaking the same Chinese dialects or growing up in the same place were 
also found to be conducive to establishing smuggling partnerships (Zhang and Chin 
2002: 750).  
 
More recently, Soudijn (2006) expanded on the study of Chinese smuggling by 
looking at the case of the Netherlands. He conducted an analysis of police files 
combined with field interviews with members of the Chinese community as well as 
police officers, and identified organizational arrangements similar to those described 
the decade before in relation to the US (Soudijn 2006). Crucially, he noted that ‘no 
evidence was found of a central organization controlling any (let alone all) smuggling 
operations, either from the Netherlands or from abroad’ (Soudijn, 2006: 127). He 
maintained that the level of coordination among different groups operating at different 
stages was minimal, and rejected the “chain” metaphor often used to describe Chinese 
smuggling operations (Soudijn, 2006: 131). 
 
Smuggling across the US-Mexican border. Spener (2009:150) carried out an in-depth 
study of smuggling across the Texan border and concluded that there was no evidence 
of monopolization of the market by a single group or even a small set of groups. 
Further, he noted that, overall, the level of sophistication of the coyotes in the 2000s 
was not “especially greater” that the “organized bands of coyotes” operating in the 
1920s (Spener 2009: 152). Similarly, Izacara Palacio (2014: 330) found no evidence 
of smugglers using violence against other smugglers in order to monopolize the 
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market. Sanchez (2015: 44) found no evidence of “the existence of a single, 
centralized, power providing operational or logical support in any of the smuggling 
groups identified.”  
 
Smuggling into Europe via Turkey and Greece. Içduygu and Toktas (2002) have 
explored the organizational arrangements underpinning the illegal movement of Iraqi 
and Iranian migrants. They described the smuggling operations as “a loosely cast 
network, consisting of hundreds of independent smaller units which cooperate along 
the way” (Içduygu and Toktas 2002: 46). They found no evidence of any “godfather-
like” figure. Rather than characterized by “international, centralized organizations,” 
they describe human smuggling in terms of “smaller, local and flexible organizations” 
(Içduygu and Toktas 2002: 46). Crucially, each organization operates independently, 
as “a small part of a larger chain” with no centralized oversight (Içduygu and Toktas 
2002: 47). In some cases, smugglers might hand over migrants directly to another 
(independent) smuggler after a border crossing (Içduygu and Toktas 2002: 46). These 
arrangements seem to have remained largely unchanged over the years (İçduygu 
2018: 33). Evidence of similar arrangements can be found also in relation to the 
movement of Afghani and Pakistani migrants (Koser 2008; Aksel et al. 2015: 19-24). 
Based on interviews with convicted Turkish-based smugglers, Demir, Sever and 
Kahya (2017: 384) note the absence of an “international umbrella organization” with 
“branches in several countries”. Rather, smuggling is based on groups that can 
“communicate and cooperate […] horizontally” across the different stages of the 
process (Demir, Sever and Kahya 2017: 384). Rather than being similar to a Mafia-
type organization, these small groups are “loosely connected” with limited – if any – 
internal hierarchy (Demir, Sever and Kahya 2017: 385). Smugglers “rarely” use 
violence and they do not carry guns (Demir, Sever and Kahya 2017: 384). This is 
confirmed by Achilli (2018: 85) in his work on the movement of Syrian migrants, 
where smuggling along the Eastern Mediterranean corridor, by crossing from Turkey 
into Greece and then onwards across the Balkans, “mostly consist[s] of a system of 
flexible and independent organizations that enter into partnerships with one another 
for short periods.” 
 
Smuggling into Southern Europe from Africa. Activities along the smuggling route 
from the Horn of Africa to Europe via Libya and Italy appear to be segmented and 
carried out by localized and rather rudimentary hierarchies (Campana 2018). 
Empirical evidence from Campana (2018), based on quantitative analysis of data 
manually extracted from court files, demonstrates that smugglers are largely 
independent and autonomous in their decisions, with indicators of competition 
amongst them.  
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Figure 1. Network of contacts among smugglers operating along the Central 
Mediterranean Route (Horn of Africa to Europe via Libya) 
 
 
Source: Campana (2018: 489).  
Note: Size of the nodes indicates degree centrality.  
 
Figure 1 shows the first formal representation of a network of smugglers. It depicts 
the connections among smugglers operating along the Central Mediterranean route 
from the Horn of Africa to Europe via Libya (migrants are excluded from the 
analysis). It is built based on real-world contacts captured in phone wiretaps, 
testimony, and other forensic evidence. Each node in the figure represents an 
individual and its size points to the level of importance in the network measured as 
the number of connections (ties) each person has established (degree centrality).  
 
The figure shows that individuals involved in the smuggling ring have different levels 
of centrality, with a small number of higher centrality actors. Contacts tend to cluster 
around those actors, suggesting the presence of rudimentary hierarchies (Campana 
2018). Such small hierarchies can be identified at all stages of the smuggling route, 
and their reach tends to remain local in scope (Campana 2018). Additionally, there is 
no evidence of a single hierarchical organization, but rather a collection of 
independent actors (Campana 2018). Even in networks involved in the supply of a 
truly transnational commodity, namely the movement of people from the Horn of 
Africa to Northern Europe, the local dimension still plays an important role. The odds 
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of connection between smugglers are almost seven times higher if they are both 
involved in the same stage of the journey (Campana 2018).  
 
 There are strong indications of competition among smugglers—a “far cry 
from the idea that smuggling markets are characterized by the presence of kingpins 
who can exert monopolistic control over a certain route” (Campana 2018: 493). Work 
on specific segments of this route point to the same conclusions. Ayalew Mengiste 
(2018:69) describes a similar segmentation of the process with smugglers specializing 
in moving migrants from Eritrea to Ethiopia or Sudan and then either connecting them 
with another smuggler or leaving them free to independently look for other smugglers 
who can facilitate the rest of the journey. Crucially, Ayalew Mengiste (2018: 71) 
points out that Eritrean migration should not be “reduced to” kidnappings for ransom 
or trafficking for organ harvesting, but rather understood as “a local and transnational, 
community-based, proximity-oriented phenomenon dependent on specific 
entanglements of social and smuggling networks.”  
 
Arrangements along the West African route appear to follow a similar pattern. 
Looking at Niger, Brachet (2018: 29) maintains that what are often defined as 
transnational networks are in fact “rather fragmented and uncoordinated chains of 
actors”. He further notes that “[t]here are no transnational criminal networks in 
Agadez but rather small-scale low-investment activities” Brachet (2018: 29). A senior 
smuggler interviewed in Agadez by Raineri (2018: 69) explained that they “mainly 
work on the basis of occasional agreements, including part-time. Anyone can be a 
smuggler for some time; you just bring your own car, and then leave with no fear of 
reprisals whatsoever.” Competition among smugglers appears to be rife in Agadez, 
bringing down prices for smuggling services (Raineri 2018: 72). Molenaar (2017) 
observed a growth of ‘travel agencies’ from 15 in 2007 to 70 in 2013.  
 
All the migration flows considered show a striking similarity in relation to the 
organization of smuggling activities. This is further observed in a review prepared for 
the European Commission in which Optimity Advisors (2015: 48) note that “for all 
the routes [in the EU] studied, migrant smuggling operations appear to be organised 
along a primarily horizontal structure of intermediaries that interface with each 
other.” While at first glance one might have the impression of hierarchical, strict top-
down organizational arrangements, a closer look “reveals that even the larger 
networks, which span over several regions, are often organised around only one or 
two main actors who control bigger or smaller networks competing or cooperating 
with each other and rely on the involvement of a range of additional actors who 
provide specific services” (Optimity Advisors 2015: 48). Smugglers are not tied to 
specific groups (Optimity Advisors 2015: 48).  
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While there are striking similarities between routes, there are also differences in the 
degree of sophistication of smuggling operations. One main factor that affect the 
(relative) complexity of smuggling operations is the difficulty in providing the service 
or, here, making a journey. Some difficulties are the consequence of natural elements: 
organizing a sea crossing across the Mediterranean requires a higher level of 
resources and specialized skills than crossing land borders in a valley. Others are the 
consequence of heightened border controls or conflicts (Optimity Advisors 2015: 48).  
 
 
B.  Internal organization  
 
While hierarchies tend to be very rudimentary—or indeed almost nonexistent—not all 
smugglers are equal. Some have more prestige, autonomy, and resources than others. 
These main actors are often referred to as “organizers” in the smuggling context 
(Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl 2006; Soudjin 2006; UNODC 2018; Optimity Advisors 
2015; Campana 2018). Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl (2006: 78) describe the organizer 
as a person who “controls the whole process.” However, while organizers by 
definition need to possess some degree of control over both processes and other 
people’s activity, the reach of their control can easily be overstated, particularly when 
relying on evidence collected from migrants who themselves might not have had any 
direct contact with the organizers (as in the case of Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl 2006: 
78). Campana (2018: 488) defines organizers as “individuals who give orders but do 
not receive them; they are in a position to make pivotal decisions regarding smuggling 
operations.” While some of them do possess international connections, their ability to 
exert direct control is however normally limited to a specific stage in the smuggling 
process, for example within the sea crossing in the Mediterranean or within the 
journey from Sicily to the next destination in continental Italy (Campana 2018).9  
 
The evidence available also shows some signs of specialization among smugglers, 
with the presence of drivers, brokers, fake documents providers, people running and 
surveilling safe houses, and money collectors (Içduygu and Toktas 2002; Zhang and 
Chin 2002; Campana 2018; UNODC 2018). Zhang and Chin (2002: 751-654) 
describe Chinese smuggling as characterized by “little hierarchical differentiation” 
but with a “well developed” division of labor. Smuggling across the Eastern 
                                               
9 That not all smugglers are equal also emerges from Zhang and Chin (2002: 748) on Chinese human 
smuggling: “Those who invested most in smuggling operations were also the ones to make the most 
money, whereas many others were merely playing auxiliary roles by recruiting clients and making 
referral fees”. 
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Mediterranean shows similar characteristics: “[e]ven though these groups generally 
lacked centralized and hierarchical structures, a number of roles could be identified 
within the organizations” (Achilli 2018: 15). A host of roles besides the organizers 
were identified, ranging from boat owners to cashiers, drivers, lookouts, and 
bodyguards (Achilli 2018).  
 
Are smuggling groups organised along ethnic lines or a shared nationality? The 
fragmented evidence we possess suggests that, broadly speaking, the answer tend to 
be in the affirmative. This is the case for the Chinese smuggling organisations studied 
by Zhang and Chin (2002) and Soudjin (2006). Based on 51 German court 
proceedings, Neske (2006) observes that higher-level smugglers tend to share the 
same ethnicity (often also with the migrants). While the core of an organization may 
be ethnically homogeneous, coordination is likely to extend to individuals of different 
ethnicities/nationalities. This is the case, for instance, with local fixers (Neske 2006). 
This is also similar to what Campana (2018) describes in relation to a smuggling ring 
operating between the Horn of Africa and Scandinavia via Libya and Italy. Of the 28 
smugglers based in Italy for which reliable information about their nationality is 
available, 18 were Eritreans, 7 Ethiopians and one from Ghana, Ivory Coast and 
Guinea (it should be noted that also the smuggled migrants are likely to have been 
overwhelmingly Eritreans: Campana 2018: 491 and fn. 18). A similar pattern emerges 
in relation to an Albanian ring operating between Belgium and the United Kingdom 
(Myria 2018: 105-106).  
 
Soudijin (2006: 46) offers further evidence on this point: of the 178 individuals 
identified by the Dutch authorities in relation to Chinese smuggling cases between 
1996 and 2003, 108 were from mainland China, 12 from Hong Kong and 2 from 
Taiwan (for a combined total of 122). While Chinese nationals remained by far the 
largest group, they have established working relationships with individuals of 12 
other nationalities, of which the largest group was (not surprisingly) constituted of 
Dutch nationals (N = 20). Why do smugglers seem to have a preference for working 
with people from the same ethnicity? It is not the ethnic background per se that 
matters; rather, ethnicity (or nationality) is a proxy for shared language, facility in 
establishing contacts and checking reputations as well as a strategy to minimise risk 
and uncertainty in carrying out the business (Zhang and Chin 2002; more generally, 
see Kleemans and van de Bunt 2003 on the importance of social ties).   
 
Finally, how can we explain how, despite being “unsophisticated” and “small scale,” 
smuggling organizations manage to move a large number of migrants? The answer 
lies in the nature of the service rendered which, by and large, does not appear to 
require a large investment in resources and capital. The story of a small ring moving 
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migrants in a van across the US-Mexican border illustrates this point well. The ring 
was comprised of five people: three men based in Austin, Texas, and two 
collaborators in Mexico—one based at the border and one working as a recruiter in 
the Mexican state of Zacatecas (Spener 2009). Based on the testimony of one of the 
smugglers, between 10 and 12 migrants were driven across the border in each trip; he 
estimated making around 30 trips in a twelve-month period charging each migrant 
$1,200 (Spener 2009: 153-154).  
 
A conservative estimate by Spener (2009: 154) puts the number of migrants smuggled 
at 600 per year with revenues in excess of $780,000. Crucially, this story shows that 
largely increasing this number would not require a large investment. Addition of a 
second van and a couple more drivers would have at least doubled that number, with 
neither resource too difficult to come by. The relative simplicity of the modus 
operandi explains the ability of smugglers to quickly adapt to changing 
circumstances, such as a sudden increase in the demand for smuggling services.. The 
same low level of resources required also suggests that a potentially large number of 
competing groups might have been in operation at the same time. This matches with 
the experience of a US federal judge interviewed by Spener (2009: 154) who had seen 
“hundreds, if not thousands, of ‘alien smuggling’ defendants in his courtroom over 
the years.”  
 
 
III.  Is smuggling a specialized activity? 
 
The empirical evidence on the socio-demographic characteristics of smugglers is very 
limited. Studies that have attempted to offer a quantitative profile of smugglers often 
rely on small convenience samples. Demir, Sever and Kahya (2017) carried out 54 
face-to-face interviews with convicted smugglers who were arrested and sentenced in 
Turkey. All interviewees were male with an average age of 36 years; 52 percent 
identified themselves as Kurdish and 32 percent as Turkish. Half of the interviewees 
had a primary school qualification, 22 percent a secondary school diploma, and 20 
percent a high school diploma (Demir, Sever and Kahya 2017: 378). Of the 292 
individuals analyzed in Campana (2018: 44) operating between the Horn of Africa 
and Scandinavia via Libya and Italy, 277 (95 percent) were male. Generally speaking, 
migrant smuggling seems to be a male-dominated business (see also Optimity 
Advisors 2015: 52).  
 
In the context of smuggling into Europe, individuals with a position of 
responsibility tend to be 35-year old or older, while aides and guides tend to be 
younger, between 18 and 25 years old (Optimity Advisors 2015: 52). Many sources 
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indicate that smugglers tend to have other legitimate occupations. This is the case for 
the smugglers interviewed by Demir, Sever and Kahya (2017: 319): 91 percent cited 
another legitimate occupation and only one described smuggling as his main activity. 
Similarly, the Chinese smugglers interviewed by Zhang and Chin (2002: 758) did not 
consider smuggling their main livelihood. They engaged in a host of legitimate 
business activities. They were a rather heterogeneous set of small business owners, 
handymen, taxi drivers, fruit stand owners, fast food restaurant owners, housewives, 
massage parlor owners, police officers and government officials (Zhang and Chin 
2002: 745). Eritrean smugglers tend to be soldiers or people who work and live in 
border areas and therefore possess experience in crossing borders, sometimes as a 
result of trading activities (Ayalew Mengiste 2018: 68). 
 
While many smugglers run legitimate activities besides smuggling, this does not seem 
to normally be the case for other illegal activities. The majority of smugglers 
interviewed by Demir, Sever and Kahya (2017: 379) had no criminal background at 
all (38 percent) or had only been involved in smuggling activities (31 percent). Only 
one interviewee was classified as related to a Mafia-type organization (without any 
further detail) and three were connected to drugs trafficking (5 percent). These 
findings are in line with the analysis of 174 smugglers arrested in Istanbul between 
2007 and 2013 by Icli, Sever and Sever (2015: 7): 47 percent did not have a criminal 
record and 23 percent had only been involved in smuggling activities. Six smugglers 
(3 percent) had also been involved in narcotics. Similarly, Stone-Cadena and Alvarez 
Velasco (2018: 205) found no evidence of “any involvement of transnational 
organized crime” in the case of smuggling out of Ecuador.  
 
Smugglers do not seem to engage in violence against fellow smugglers. Of the 28 
Italian-based smugglers identified in Campana (2018: 491), none was involved in 
violence against any other smuggler in the network. Similarly, Zhang and Chin (2002) 
maintained that violence among smugglers was rare. They suggested that violence 
might carry negative consequences particularly concerning their desire “to build and 
maintain a trustworthy image” (Zhang and Chin 2002: 756). Violence does not appear 
to be a valuable resource, and smugglers themselves prefer to convey an image of 
themselves as service providers, as travel agents for people who cannot enlist the 
services of a legal one (as in the case of smugglers interviewed by Achilli 2018 in the 
Eastern Mediterranean). The Mexican smugglers described by Sanchez (2018: 149) 
were mostly marginalized ordinary citizens who entered the market in “an attempt to 
supplement their incomes rather than driven by criminal intention.”  
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I now turn to first discuss the relationship between the smuggling of people and 




A.  Human smuggling and drug trafficking  
 
To what extent are drug trafficking organizations involved in the smuggling of 
migrants? And vice versa?  
 
Chin (1999) explored this issue in relation to heroin smuggling from Southeast Asia 
and found little evidence of smugglers being involved in drug trafficking, contrary to 
claims by US authorities. Of the 300 migrants he interviewed, only one admitted that 
he was asked by smugglers to carry two bags of opium (from the Golden Triangle to 
Bangkok; Chin 1999). No drugs were seen on board vessels by those who left China 
by sea (Chin 1999: 35). What about the Mexican-US route, one of the major routes 
for both drug trafficking and migrant smuggling? This is a place where some of the 
more sophisticated drug trafficking organizations operate and at the same time there is 
a considerable demand for smuggling services. Yet, there is little evidence of a 
mélange of smuggling of drugs and migrants.  
 
Spener (2009) reviewed 197 cases of “alien smuggling” prosecuted in the federal 
courthouse of Laredo in the early 2000s, and found only one case in which drugs (47 
pounds of marijuana) had also been seized. Only between 10 and 15 percent of “alien 
smuggling” defendants in Texas courts had previous convictions for drugs felonies, 
and these were often for simple possession and not sale or distribution (Spener 2009; 
it is not uncommon for smugglers to use cocaine or marijuana during the difficult 
crossings). Qualitative evidence from a host of informants, including migrants, 
smugglers, human rights activists, U.S. attorneys, probation officers, public 
defendants, judges, and law enforcement officials, almost unanimously indicated that, 
despite other claims in the press, drug trafficking and human smuggling at the end of 
1990s and early 2000s were “generally separate businesses” (Spener 2009: 155-156). 
Overall, “it did not appear that drug-moving and people-moving were necessarily 
carried out by a single organization” (Spener 2009: 157).   
 
This separation seems to have persisted over the years. According to Izcara Palacios 
(2014: 324), the empirical evidence on ties between migrant smuggling and drug 
trafficking is “scarce.” His interviews with 85 smugglers suggest a clear separation 
between migrant smuggling and drug trafficking also in the mind of smugglers 
themselves. As one smuggler put it (Izcara Palacios 2014: 336), “[e]ither you’re a 
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pollero and carry people, or you’re a drug dealer and carry drugs. Over there you 
can’t do both things at once.” 
 
This does not imply that coyotes might not switch from migrant smuggling to drug 
trafficking. Spener (2009: 156) found evidence of men who used to work as 
smugglers and then decided to join a drug trafficking organization, mainly due to the 
prospect of higher profits. Good smugglers make for good recruits for drug trafficking 
organizations, as they possess a knowledge of routes and trails. However, when 
smugglers decide to join a drug trafficking organization, they “leave coyotaje” and 
“cut ties with the social world” outside the drug trafficking organization (Izcara 
Palacios 2014: 331). Migrants and drugs do “not typically appear to be transported 
and housed in the same places at the same times” (Spener 2009: 157). Further, some 
segments of routes might be entirely off-limits to migrants as “drug traffickers prefer 
to keep migrants out of drug trafficking routes, most likely to avoid unwanted 
attention from law enforcement” (Sanchez and Zhang 2018: 142). 
 
In recent years, there have been increasing numbers of reports of migrants carrying 
backpacks with drugs across the US-Mexico border. However, Sanchez and Zhang 
(2018: 143) argue that this should not be interpreted as a sign of a convergence 
between human smuggling and drug trafficking operations as migrants’ testimonies 
indicate that “the decision to carry drugs often was a personal, complex choice, rather 
than the result of coercion.” It was more a consequence of lack of financial resources 
“to cover basic needs like room or board, or having run out of money after traveling 
vast distances and no longer able to afford smuggling fees, [that] some migrants opted 
to assist drug traffickers in exchange for financial compensation or transportation 
within the United States” (Sanchez and Zhang 2018: 143).  
 
Working with drug traffickers can mean improved travel conditions for the migrants 
and access to faster routes that are inaccessible to smugglers (Sanchez and Zhang 
2018: 143-144). Far from being integrated within a single organization, traffickers 
and smugglers seem to offer separate, somewhat competitive travel options. Crucially, 
Sanchez and Zhang point out that “our data also show that migrants were able to 
decline, along some corridors and in some instances, collaborations with criminal 
actors with no repercussion. Among our respondents, for example, no one reported 
having faced retaliation as a result of his or her unwillingness to work or travel with 
drug traffickers” (Sanchez and Zhang 2018: 147). Overall, the argument that a 
convergence between human smuggling and drug trafficking organizations—let alone 
a takeover from the latter—has indeed taken place along the Mexican corridor 




B.  Protectors and smugglers 
 
The relationship between smugglers and protectors is a crucial one—yet it is often 
misread or overlooked. In their works on the Italian-American Mafia, Schelling 
(1971) and Reuter (1983; 1985) pointed to a separation between individuals 
specialized in protection (governance) and other illegal actors. Such a separation 
holds true also in the case of human smuggling.  
 
Zhang and Chin (2002: 747) found no clear evidence of “a connection between 
human smugglers and traditional Chinese crime groups in the United States or 
elsewhere”: of the 90 individuals interviewed, only three claimed to be members of a 
traditional criminal organizations and none was participating in smuggling “on behalf 
of their gangs.” Instead, the majority of the interviewees “took efforts not to entangle 
themselves with street gangs or other crime groups in the Chinese community. 
However, this does not mean that none of the smugglers have access to gangs when 
the situation calls for it” (Zhang and Chin 2002: 747). Smuggling, they argue, is 
separate from traditional Chinese criminal societies such as triads, tongs, and street 
gangs that are normally involved in racketeering activities. Crucially, members of 
such criminal organization can participate in the trade, but participation is typically on 
their own, independently (Zhang and Chin 2002: 763). 
 
Campana (2018) analyzed a “busy” smuggling route cutting across Sicily – an island 
with a longstanding Mafia presence. However, there was no evidence of any 
involvement of the Sicilian Mafia in smuggling activities taking place in Sicily or 
elsewhere, despite the Italian island being a key point in the smuggling route. No 
payment of protection money to the Sicilian Mafia was identified either.  
 
Smugglers can enlist the services of a protector if needed, for instance to recover a 
debt. This emerges neatly from the testimony of a Chinese smuggler based in the US: 
“If a client fails to live up to her end of the agreement, I will have to ask her to return 
the money. I don’t worry a bit about not getting my money back. I have someone who 
is a Vietnamese gang member and I will ask him to pay her a visit. […] I believe she 
will pay me quickly. But I don’t like to use these debt collectors. They charge 50 
percent of the collected money.” (quoted in Zhang and Chin 2002: 747).  
 
An equally clear separation between the roles of smugglers and protectors was 
identified in Libya with militia members playing the role of protector. A statistical 
analysis of the interactions within a smuggling ring demonstrated that smugglers are 
more likely to coordinate with fellow smugglers and militia members with other 
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militia members (Campana 2018: 490; odds ratio = 6.3, p<.001). This does not, 
however, imply complete separation as cross-role interactions did take place mostly in 
the form of smugglers paying bribes to militia members in order to be able to operate.  
 
The payment of protection fees to local militias has also been documented by 
journalists. Reporting from Libya, Kirkpatrick (2015) offers some estimate for those 
fees: in 2015, smugglers paid $100 or more at each local militia checkpoint for each 
truck carrying around 15-20 migrants; permission to use a secure departure point 
would cost as much as $20,000 a month (Kirkpatrick 2015). Crucially, militias would 
normally not be directly involved in human smuggling, but would charge smugglers a 
fee for the right to operate in the territory they control (Micallef 2017: 32). The 
practice continued until mid-2017 when, under pressure from European countries, 
militias have stopped – or considerably reduced – protecting smugglers (Micallef 
2017: 9; Lewis and Scherer 2017). Together with the implementation of a coast guard 
under direct control of the Tripoli-based government, the switch in the militias’ 
attitude towards smuggling is thought to have largely contributed to the large decline 
in sea crossings out of Libya (down 80.2 percent between 2017 and 2018, and with a 
further decrease in 2019; see Table 1 and Section V).  In some instances, as in Niger, 
official authorities levy protection fees on smugglers (Brachet 2012: 100). Local 
police officers levy arbitrary taxes at checkpoints ranging between 500 CFA – slightly 
less than one USD – and a few thousand CFA (around 10 USD: Brachet 2012: 102). 
Based on direct field observations between 2003 and 2008, Brachet (2012: 108) 
estimated the annual revenues generated by such protection rackets at between 861m 
CFA and 3.5bn CFA (1.5 million USD to 6 million USD).  
 
In the case of Mexico, there is ample evidence of protection fees imposed by those 
drug trafficking organizations that also have control over a territory. The protection 
money, known as el piso or derechos de piso, is “a one-time toll to access specific 
parts of the migrant trail under the control of a DTO [Drug Trafficking Organization]. 
The payment of piso entitled migrants and their guides to, in theory, travel without 
fear” (Sanchez and Zhang 2018: 141; see also Sanchez 2018: 154 and Izacara Palacio 
2014: 3). As for the case of Libya, protectors do not seem to be directly involved in 
smuggling: out of 85 Mexican smugglers interviewed by Izcara Palacio (2014: 333), 
96 percent claimed that drug cartels were not directly involved in smuggling (three 
interviewees gave an affirmative answer; however, one was relying on hearsay and a 
second wasn’t able to provide details of such involvement). Rather than being 
involved directly in the smuggling of migrants, established organised crime groups 
levy a tax for the “right” to smuggle migrants across the territory they control. The 
separation between smugglers and protections emerges neatly also from the words of 
migrants, as in the following quote: 
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Margot: Along the border, the ones who govern all that are the, the … how are 
those called?  
Leslie: La Mafia.  
Margot: La Mafia?  
Leslie: Yes, you only pay [la mafia] when you arrive with the coyote [to a 
specific point].  
Margot: Yes, [the smuggler] gives [the fee] to the mafia  
(quoted in Sanchez and Zhang 2018: 141).  
 
Leutert (2018: 19) indicates that organised crime groups, such as the Gulf Cartels and 
the remaining factions of the Zeta Cartels, are still taxing the movement of people as 
well as goods—particularly in the state of Tamaulipas. According to Leutert (2018: 
19), “the failure of a smuggler to pay the proper fee for migrants to cross a TCO’s 
[transnational criminal organization] territory might also lead to the migrants being 
kidnapped.” In some cases, drug trafficking organizations might deliberately leave 
“scary” signs on the route, for instance burned or flipped cars, as a warning to those 
who don’t pay the fee (in Sanchez and Zhang 2018: 142). In the testimonies collected 
by Sanchez and Zhang (2018), the threat of violence was sufficient for smugglers to 
comply with the protectors’ requests.  
 
Organized crime groups involved in protection might recruit former smugglers to help 
them levy the “protection tax” given the former smugglers’ knowledge of the routes, 
their ability to detect other smugglers and identify those who had not paid their 
derechos de piso as well as their ability to “know how to gain their [migrants’] trust 
and distinguish between those with money and those without” (Izcara Palacios 2014: 
332).  
 
This separation between smugglers and protectors is often neglected in the public 
discourse. In some cases, including Mexico, there is an often-repeated 
narrative/mantra that “cartels are entering” the smuggling business. However, there 
are two problems with this. First, the word “entering” is rather vague and does not 
give us any indication about whether cartels are directly involved in smuggling or 
they are taxing smugglers. Secondly, media descriptions are often superficial in their 
reporting. In a case discussed by Spener (2009: 159). English-language news sources 
such as the Associated Press and the San Antonio Express news “wrote reports 
suggesting the direct involvement of the cartel in transporting people” while the 
Mexico City-based newspaper La Jornada “indicated that the cartel’s arrested leaders 
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were involved only in charging coyotes the derecho de piso in Reynosa, formerly paid 




IV. The mechanisms of smuggling: reputation and warranties  
 
Smugglers often operate in an environment where multiple organizations are active at 
the same time (Campana 2017; Achilli 2018). Further, it has been documented that 
these organizations might be in competition to attract migrants (Campana 2018). 
Migrants, on the other side, will look for clues that will reassure them about the 
quality and the reliability of the service rendered by smugglers, trying to avoid 
cheaters and unscrupulous smugglers. According to a survey with undocumented 
migrants who had been deported to six Mexican cities, the main qualities that 
migrants value in smugglers are “trustworthiness, honesty, comportment, and 
treatment” (Slack and Martinez 2018: 152). Building trust, therefore, is of extreme 
importance for smugglers to be “successful” (also Sanchez 2018: 151 on the case of 
Mexico). However, smugglers operate in a context of illegality in almost all parts of 
the world.  
 
As of April 2019, a total of 112 states has ratified the UN Protocol against the 
Smuggling of Migrants (UN 2000) making smuggling of migrants a criminal offense. 
This condition of illegality has consequences on how the market for smuggling 
services operates. Firstly, it prevents the establishment of any formal enforcement 
mechanism to solve disputes, ensure compliance and enforce contracts (Reuter 1983: 
Ch. 5 and 1985; Campana and Varese 2013). Furthermore, illegality has a direct 
impact on the availability and quality of the information available. Sellers may find it 
more difficult and costly to advertise their products and services (Reuter 1983 and 
1985; Gambetta 2009; Campana and Varese 2013) while buyers may find it more 
difficult to collect reliable information about the quality of the services offered 
(Reuter 1985; Campana and Varese 2013). Moreover, illegality may make it more 
difficult to track actors, which is further exacerbated by the potentially higher-than-
                                               
10 The relationship between smugglers and kidnappers is also often misunderstood. Campana 
(2018) has shown a clear separation between smugglers and kidnappers operating across the 
Libyan desert. This separation also emerges neatly from the words of a former Eritrean 
smuggler: “We often travel at night. But the hyenas and Rashida kidnappers are active at 
night. You must know how and when to move to safe routes. A single mistake may lead all of 
us to a disaster: imprisonment, death or kidnapping by kidney harvesters or ransom in the 
Egyptian desert” (quoted in Ayalew Mengiste 2018: 68) 
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average mobility of the individuals involved in irregular migrations.  
 
In many ways, the smuggling market resembles the market for second-hand cars 
studied by the economist George Akerlof (1970). As for the car sellers, the smugglers 
(sellers) also possess more information about the quality of their products than the 
migrants (buyers), and it is very difficult for the latter to tell the difference between a 
reliable smuggler and a cheater. Were all smugglers being equally reliable, the 
problem of asymmetric information would be irrelevant. However, much like the car 
dealers, the smuggling market is also populated by sellers with varying degree of 
trustworthiness, as well as outright cheaters and impostors (see, alas, Slack and 
Martinez 2018: 170 for evidence). For example, there has been documented instances 
of individuals posing as smugglers in bus terminals and areas around the international 
bridges in border towns in Mexico in order to swindle migrants or lead them to 
isolated places and then assault and rob them (Spener 2009: 155).  
 
The problem of asymmetric information is intensified in the case of smuggling by the 
potentially severe consequences that migrants might face if they pick a dishonest 
smuggler.11 The trust problem is, thus, a crucial dimension of human smuggling, 
following previous works that have highlighted the importance of trust in supporting 
transactions in general (see, among others, Gambetta 1988; Coleman 1990; 
Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994) and in contexts where contracts cannot be drafted or 
enforced (Reuters 1985; Gambetta 1993; Campana and Varese 2013). Smugglers 
themselves have indeed described their work as “a business that requires trust” 
(Achilli 2018: 89; see also van Liempt 2007: 171). How, then, do they go about in 





One strategy to solve the trust problem and create a competitive advantage vis-à-vis 
the fellow smugglers is to invest in one’s reputation. Work by Reuter (1983; 1985) 
has stressed the importance of reputation in contexts characterized by illegality. 
Human smuggling is no exception. Possessing a reputation for being reliable and 
competent is viewed as a vital aspect of a smuggler’s identity (also Bilger, Hofmann 
and Jandl 2006). Smugglers may go to great lengths in their attempts to build a 
positive reputation.  
                                               
11 Cheaters and impostors are more likely to abuse migrants than bona fide smugglers: “A 
close reading of several Tamaulipas newspapers in the late 1990s indicated that some of the 
abuses that were attributed to coyotes were committed by people posing as coyotes who never 
had any intention of transporting their victims to a U.S. destination” (Spener 2009: 155). 
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In the case of Chinese smuggling, Chin (1999) has documented instances of top-level 
smugglers who have contributed money to their hometown and made generous 
donations to improve local infrastructures. The importance of a good reputation is 
highlighted also by migrants who have been smuggled: “Big snakeheads are mainly 
wealthy business owners. That’s why people trust them. […] Big snakeheads have got 
to have a good reputation” (quoted in Chin 1999: 30, emphasis added).12 Things have 
not changed over the years. In their report for the European Commission, Optimity 
Advisors (2015: 45) pointed out that in “places with high competition […], smugglers 
care about their reputation” (also Bilger, Hofmann and Jandl 2006). In a phone call 
wiretapped by the Italian authorities, a smuggler claims to have paid “compensation” 
to the families of the victims of a deadly shipwreck in the Mediterranean Sea:  
 
[Yusef] continues saying that his fellow countrymen trusted him, and he is 
extremely sorry for what happened; contrary to other organizers, he had 
personally notified the families who have lost somebody in the shipwreck, and 
he had even sent 5000 dollars to his village and to the village named ‘Adi 
Hargets’ for the relatives of the victims from these areas. (police summary of 
the conversation, quoted in Campana 2018: 495).  
 
A reputation for being efficient and reliable become all the more important as the 
market becomes more competitive. In another wiretapped conversation, the same 
smuggler expresses concern about his competitors being able to offer a better service 
to the migrants:  
 
Yusef asks Samuel if there is any news. Samuel replies that he has been there [in 
the Reception Centre] for 28 days, and two of Muhammad’s boats have arrived 
in the last two days. Yusef then complains, asking why the guy isn’t sending 
‘ours’ … while the others keep sending people. (police summary of the 
conversation, quoted in Campana 2018: 495).13 
 
Evidence from the Mexican route points to a similar picture. In a context where there 
is no monopoly of a single smuggler or group of smugglers, migrants would normally 
                                               
12 While most of Chin’s respondents viewed “big snakeheads as smart and capable business 
people with power, wealth, good reputation, and connections” (Chin 1999: 32), not all 
smugglers enjoy a good reputation. Some were described by respondents as “selfish, 
untrustworthy people who cared nothing for the needs and feeling of their customers” (Chin 
199: 31).  
13 Interestingly, the same smuggler is also aware of the importance of collective reputations. 
In another phone wiretap, he suggests that his interlocutor should talk to a smuggler “who has 
embarked some people against their relatives’ will” as such behavior will hurt “everybody” 
(Campana 2018: 495). He then gives the example of “a group of people who share the same 
house whose bathroom is dirty, and it reflects badly on everybody, not just on the person who 
has made the bathroom dirty” (police summary of the conversation, quoted in Campana 2018: 
495). 
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choose a smuggler based on his or her reputation for “being competent and 
trustworthy or at least […] less incompetent and less trustworthy than other coyotes” 
(Spener 2009: 73, also p. 173). Besides the loss of potential customers, a bad 
reputation might increase the risk of apprehension for smugglers as those who were 
known to abuse and extort migrants also appeared to be more likely to be targeted by 
law enforcement, as they were more likely to be reported on by their “dissatisfied” 
customers (Spener 2009: 173).14  
 
Smugglers may use the collective bad reputation of a set of competitors to gain a 
competitive advantage. This has been documented, for instance, on the Southern 
Mexican border where Mexican smugglers stress their nationality vis-à-vis their 
Central American competitors to benefit from “the bad reputation of their Central 
American counterparts, and do their best to maintain the tensions around this 
imaginary” (Guevara Gonzalez 2018: 184).  
 
While a good reputation is a very valuable asset, protecting it might pose challenges 
to smugglers. Reuter (1985) has highlighted the difficulties in monitoring members 
when an illegal organization grows in size and expands its reach. These difficulties 
hold true also in the case of smugglers. Spener (2009: 175) observes that when 
participants in smuggling operations “were separated from one another 
geographically, did not engage in frequent and intense face-to-face interactions with 
one another, and specialized in activities at only one point along the chain, it could be 
difficult for participants to be very confident about precisely how their collaborators 
were behaving when they were not physically with them.” A (costly) solution would 
be to maintain a close monitoring throughout the whole journey, for example by 
having a trusted person travelling with the migrants (there has been documented cases 
                                               
14 Smugglers can also be held “hostage” by migrants to make sure that they will hold to their 
promises by collecting compromising information that can be used against them (Gambetta 
2009; Campana and Varese 2013; see Schelling 1960 for a theoretical discussion on hostage-
taking as a strategy to ensure commitment). The testimony of a Syrian migrant who had 
successfully reached the United Kingdom points to the use of this strategy following an 
unsuccessful attempt at crossing the Aegean Sea: “We had the number of the smuggler and 
called him and told him this happened with us and the boat was broken and we didn’t tell the 
police about you and because of we want a new trip or we will return to the police. You are 
this person and one of the men said that ‘I have a photo of you. I took a photo of you. Believe 
me I will publish the photo if you don’t bring us another boat and we also have children and 
women with us so behave with us’ and he [the smuggler] said ‘okay, okay, tomorrow I will 







in which smugglers have resorted to this strategy within some smuggler organizations 
operating between San Luis Potosí in Central Mexico to Atlanta, Georgia: Spener 
2009: 175). However, as the risk of detection and imprisonment increases, this 
solution can quickly become too costly and smugglers might decide to segment their 
business and, as a consequence, only provide services over a well-defined (shorter) 
leg of the journey.  
 
Reputations associated with illegal activities possess a further characteristic: they tend 
not to travel easily (Reuter 1985). It is then not surprising that smugglers and migrants 
tend to come from the same place as this shared milieu helps information travel more 
easily while at the same time increases the cost of cheating. This emerges neatly from 
the story of Abu Hamza, the Syrian head of a large smuggling organization 
(composed of around 30 people) based in Turkey, collected by Achilli (2018). 
Formerly the owner of a jewellery shop in his village, he had both the economic and 
social capital to open the smuggling enterprise. Despite operating out of Turkey, most 
of his customers as well as his associates came from the same village in Syria: Abu 
Hamza’s village. A similar pattern can be detected in the case of smuggling by 
Somalis and Afghanis. As maintained by Majidi (2018: 106), the “choice of a 
smuggler starts within the community.” Smugglers are often known directly to the 
migrant or through relatives and friends (Majidi 2018: 98). Migrants have an 
incentive to choose smugglers they know; likewise, smugglers have a similar 
incentive so that they can locate the family of the migrants if needed, for instance in 
relation to collecting payments (Majidi 2018: 98). The further migrants travel from 
home, the “ties that bind and protect migrants in their journeys become more and 
more tenuous” (Majidi 2018: 98), hence exposing them to a greater risk.  
 
The important role of the community of origin has been identified also in the case of 
Ecuadorian smuggling. Stone-Cadena and Alvarez Velasco (2018: 202) write that 
indigenous people would normally choose indigenous smugglers on the belief that 
“the community itself would have greater leverage over the actions of coyotes 
because of their membership in the community, therefore ensuring the safety and 
protection of migrants traveling under their watch.” There is an expectation that 
“indigenous coyotes would be more accountable to their communities, as the ties were 
stronger than with mestizos, especially if the coyote resided in the same village or 
province in which he recruited clients” (Stone-Cadena and Alvarez Velasco 2018: 
202). During their fieldwork in indigenous communities, Stone-Cadena and Alvarez 
Velasco (2018: 203) found that information on a smuggler’s behavior was routinely 
fed back to the local community.15  
                                               
15 Shared ethnicity, language and—ever more so—birthplace also help smugglers to solve 
their internal monitoring problems. Zhang and Chin’s (2002: 762) observe that in Chinese 
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Finally, while communities, word-of-mouth, and personal referrals still remain the 
main conduit of information (see, for instance, Optimity Advisor and Seefar 2018 for 
a study of West African migrants), over the years smugglers have started to make use 
of the opportunities offered by social media and the Internet more generally to 
promote their business and their reputation (Optimity Advisors 2015:37; Roberts 
2017). Dekker et al. 2018 show that 80 percent of the 51 Syrian refugees they 
interviewed in the Netherlands consulted social networking sites such as Facebook 
and LinkedIn before migrating.16 While technology enables the circulation of 
information to wider audiences beyond friends and family members, it recast the trust 
problem in new ways. Roberts (2017) looked at ten Arabic-speaking Facebook groups 
in which smuggling services were advertised and discussed. In the online 
environment, smugglers developed new strategies to boost their reputation and build 
trust. For instance, they would post a picture of themselves at the end of a successful 
trip or they may share videos received from migrants they have successfully 
smuggled to indicate reliability. A particularly powerful strategy is to post screenshots 
of conversations – generally on WhatsApp or Telegram – that a smuggler has had 
with his clients while they were en route to their destination. This is done with the 
purpose of building an image of themselves as reliable, caring and polite (Roberts 
2017: 21-23). In addition, social media also offers a platform to exchange feedback on 
smugglers. This is similar to how well-known online platforms, such as eBay, 
operate. Migrants can then rely on online feedback to check the credentials of a given 
smugglers. In the Facebook groups analysed by Roberts (2017), she identified 
instances of both positive and negative feedback in relation to named smugglers; in 
some cases, smugglers even replied to the criticisms and tried to redress the situation 
(Roberts 2017: 40-46).17 Interviews with Arab-speaking migrants have confirmed the 
existence of online rating systems for smugglers and suggested that, in some 
instances, migrants had checked such reviews with those who had posted them 
(Campana and Gelsthorpe, forthcoming).  
 
                                               
smuggling the “enforcement of contracts and assignments relies heavily on informal social 
control sustained through a cultural environment that promotes shared expectations and 
understanding of the tasks at hand”, and that “familial relations, speaking the same dialect, or 
sharing the same ancestral townships” reinforce this informal social control.  
16 Of the 655 migrants in Slack and Martinez’s sample (2018: 162), 53 percent were referred 
to the smuggler by someone they knew, 11 percent personally knew the smuggler before the 
crossing attempt and 36 percent had no prior tie with the smuggler.   
17 Tech-savvy migrants are more likely to take advantage of online platforms to check 
smugglers’ credentials, and thus decrease their risk of victimization along the journey. The 
opposite is true for migrants coming from rural areas and/or with lower educational levels. 
This disadvantage has been highlighted in relation to migrants coming from rural areas in 




B. Warranties, payments and escrow services  
 
Another strategy that smugglers have developed to support transactions is to offer some 
forms of warranty. One type of warranty is in form of a “multiple-attempts” insurance: 
if a journey is not successful, migrants will be able to repeat it at no additional cost. 
Akerlof (1970) has identified warranties as a strategy that “good” sellers might adopt 
to differentiate themselves from the “bad” ones (as only the “good” sellers would be 
able to afford offering such warranties). Similarly, smugglers might give migrants the 
“right” to re-attempt a crossing for free if they were unable to reach their agreed 
destination. These insurance policies might “cover” both organisational caused failures 
as well as interceptions by law enforcement authorities.  
 
In their report for the European Commission, Optimity Advisors (2015: 46) indicate 
that when “an advance payment has been agreed, the contract often entails clauses 
indicating the number of attempts (including a supply of fresh documents if needed).” 
This practice has been commonly reported along the Eastern Mediterranean route. 
However, it is not limited to this route. A similar arrangement is in place in relation to 
the route from Ecuador to Mexico/US, where smugglers give migrants three chances to 
make the journey (Álvarez Velasco 2018: 179). Similarly, it has also been described at 
the Southern Mexican border where “some facilitators offered border crossing 
packages that included multiple crossing attempts. If the migrant was detained by 
immigration authorities, robbed along the way, or extorted by drug trafficking 
organizations, becoming unable to complete the journey, he or she could contact the 
facilitator after to use his or her additional travel ‘credits’” (Guevara Gonzalez 2018: 
186-187). There is evidence of a three-attempt guarantee also in relation to the crossings 
from Pakistan to Iran (for both Afghani and Pakistani migrants: Aksel et al. 2015: 20). 
Interviews with Arab-speaking migrants smuggled into Greece and the UK have 
highlighted situations in which smugglers have indeed honoured these multi-attempt 
“contracts” (Campana and Gelsthorpe forthcoming).  
 
Payment arrangements can also be designed in a way that offers warranties about the 
reliability of a given smuggler. One possibility is to split the payment into two parts: a 
deposit before departure and the remaining amount upon successful arrival (see 
Optimity Advisors 2015: 46 for examples in relation to smuggling into Europe). The 
deposit offers a two-way warranty: it gives assurances to the migrant and, crucially, 
also to the smuggler. A non-refundable deposit commits a migrant to buy the service 
of that given smuggler. This will protect the smuggler from a migrant switching to a 
competitor while at the same time increasing the incentives for smugglers to deliver 
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on their promises. The expectation is that smugglers will be more inclined to offer this 
type of arrangement the more competitive a given market is.  
 
The case of Chinese smuggling is particularly interesting given the high sums at 
stake. Smugglers have responded to this by developing some (relatively) sophisticated 
financial arrangements. In the late 1990s, with an average smuggling fee of $27,745, 
migrants were required to make a down payment of $1,000 on average (Chin 1999: 
37). In some cases, the trust problem appeared to be so acute that even this down 
payment was not paid in advance, but only when the journey had actually started: 
“Once I got on the ship, I turned over my identification card to the little snakeheads 
and they went to my home, collected the $1,000, and returned the identification card 
to my family” (quoted in Chin 1999: 37). Secondly, informal contracts were drawn 
detailing rules and obligations as the largest part of the payment had to be collected at 
some stage after the arrival. As noted by Chin (1999: 37), “one chilling aspect of 
these contracts is the understanding by both parties that the smugglers can hold their 
clients hostage if the clients, upon arrival in America, do not come up with the 
smuggling fee.” An arrangement of this kind create large monitoring costs for the 
smugglers – as the smuggling fee might not be paid back in full for long periods (see 
Chin 1999: 30 for evidence on this point). The US Department for Homeland Security 
(DHS 2018: 48) found evidence of similar arrangements along the US-Mexican route 
where, until the end of 2000s, smugglers would charge an initial fee of as little as 
$100 and then $1,000-$3,000 upon arriving at the final destination. These prices have 
gone up more recently to up to $1,200 for the initial stage and $8,000 at the final 
destination (DHS 2018: 48).  
 
 
More generally, asking for only a partial payment in advance opens up the issue of 
how smugglers can be sure that a migrant will pay the remaining amount once the 
journey is completed. While in close-knit communities it might be possible to monitor 
agents over long periods of time, in most cases smugglers face an almost impossible 
challenge. From the evidence available on the structure of smuggling operations, 
because activities are fragmented and because smugglers are normally involved in just 
one segment of a much longer journey (see Section II), it is extremely difficult and 
costly for a Turkish-based smuggler or a Libyan-based smuggler to monitor migrants 
once they have disembarked in Italy or Greece, and a fortiori collect the remaining 
sums.  
 
Escrow services offer a solution to this problem. An escrow service is an arrangement 
whereby a third party is brought in to receive the agreed sum of money and then 
eventually disburse it only when the conditions agreed by the seller and the buyer are 
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met. In the case of smuggling, this is when a migrant has successfully reached the 
agreed destination. Normally, the system works along these lines: when the migrant 
pays the third-party the agreed sum of money, he or she receives a code; once the 
agreed journey is complete, the migrant communicates the code to the smuggler (or 
the third-party) and the sum is released. Provided that the third-party is mutually 
trusted by both smuggler and migrant, the system increases the confidence of 
migrants in choosing a given smuggler while offering to a smuggler the guarantee that 
the full amount is available and accessible (with conditions).  
 
The use of escrow services had been identified already in the early 2000s in relation 
to Iraqi smugglers operating along the Turkish route into Europe (Içduygu and Toktas 
2002: 48). The practice has continued over the years along the Turkey-Greece route 
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis 2012: Ch. 5 and 6). This mechanism does not appear 
to be confined to this specific route. For instance, there is evidence of Somali 
migrants using “financial facilitators” that act as escrow services (Majidi 2018: 
107).18 Hawalader, the operators of the hawala financial network, might also double 
as escrow services (Hawala is an informal money transfer system; it is comparable to 
non-banking financial institutions such as Western Union or MoneyGram, see Varese 
2016). The Hawala-system is commonly used by migrants from the Horn of Africa, 
Middle East, Central and South Asia (particularly Afghanistan and Pakistan; Optimity 
Advisors 2015: 47). Legal non-banking systems such as Western Union or Money 
Gram have also been reported to have been used (Optimity Advisors 2015: 47).  
 
Besides offering warranties in the form of an escrow service, international non-baking 
systems also have a crucial desirable quality: they allow for the separation between 
the place where their smuggling service is rendered and that where the payment is 
carried out (and the money kept). This emerged clearly in the case of the Eritrean 
smugglers operated in Libya described in Campana (2018: 493). While the service 
was often sought and agreed in Libya, the payment was made into a deposit held by a 
hawalader based in Israel. This is a mutually convenient arrangement as it decreases 
the level of risk for both smugglers and migrants: migrants do not have to carry large 
sums of cash money while travelling and smugglers do not have to stack large amount 
of money in unsafe areas (such as Libya; see also Majidi 2018). The international 
reach of, say, a hawala network also allows for the money being paid on behalf of the 
                                               
18 There is evidence that, in case of intense competition, smugglers might have to 
accept a full payment only upon successful completion of the journey without the 
guarantee of a “financial facilitator” (Majidi 2018: 111).   
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migrant by relatives living in the country of origin or in a diaspora community with 
very little cost.19 
 
 
V. Assessing the policy response  
 
A very limited number of studies have looked at the impact of changes in policies on 
the dynamics of human smuggling. Quantitative assessments of policy responses are 
rare. While some have looked at changes in legislation on the decision to migrate 
irregularly (Bazzi et al. 2018), the impact of heightened border controls on the 
decisions to enlist the services of a smugglers has been rarely measured. One 
exception is a study by Massey, Durand and Pren (2016: 1565), which used data on 
border crossings collected by the Mexican Migration Project with 151,785 Mexican 
individuals surveyed in 23,851 households, and then matched it with data on US 
expenditure on border patrol as well as information on social and socioeconomic 
conditions in both Mexico and the US. They found that the rapid increase in border 
enforcement that began in 1986 (a) had no effect on the likelihood of initiating 
undocumented migration to the US; (b) displaced migrant routes from safer crossing 
locations to much riskier territories, such as the Sonoran Desert; (c) increased the 
likelihood that migrants will enlist the service of a smuggler; and (d) had only a 
modest increase in the likelihood of apprehension of undocumented migrants 
(Massey, Durand and Pren 2016: 1590). They also found that making the journey 
riskier and costlier had changed the dynamics of migration: when migrants needed to 
enlist the service of a smuggler to migrate, they were unlikely to ever return to their 
country of origin (Mexico in this case). A once circular migration morphed into a one-
way migration due to the change in incentives. The probability of returning to Mexico 
fell from 0.48 in 1980 to zero in 2010, with some significant yearly fluctuations 
(Massey, Durand and Pren 2016: 1590).  
 
                                               
19 There is some variation across nationalities as how the payments are collected. 
There have been cases among Afghani migrants in which a full payment was made in 
advance by giving some property or other assets to a “principal” smuggler who then 
takes on the responsibility of financing the migrants’ journey until their final 
destination (Içduygu and Toktas 2002: 48). It is unclear what type of warranties this 
“principal” smuggler offers apart from, perhaps, being embedded in the same 
community as the migrant’s family. Further, this arrangement has the potential to 
increase the vulnerability of migrants as the latter become fully dependent on the 
choices of the “principal” smuggler including in relation to the routes taken and the 
means of transportation chosen (some evidence on this point can be inferred from 
Içduygu and Toktas 2002: 48).  
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In the end, Massey, Durand and Pren (2016: 1592) concluded, the “militarization [of 
the US border] failed to reduce undocumented entry but paradoxically did reduce the 
rate of return migration to increase the net rate of unauthorized migration and increase 
undocumented population growth [in the US].” They estimated that, had the border 
patrol budget remained at the same level as 1986, the undocumented Mexican 
population in the US would have been 31 percent lower than the recorded 2010 level 
(Massey, Durand and Pren 2016: 1593). The work of Massey, Durand and Pren 
(2016: 1577) has also shown that the increase in enforcement led to an increase in the 
cost of the crossing due to an increase in the price of the smuggling services (they 
estimated an increase of $732 in crossing costs for each point increase in the log of 
Border Patrol budget; this translates into an implied increase of $507 when the Border 
Patrol budget is doubled: Massey, Durand and Pren 2016: 1577). Crossing through 
arduous points, such as the Sonoran Desert, would add an extra $116 per trip 
(Massey, Durand and Pren 2016: 1577). An increase in smuggling fees over the years 
is also reported by the US Department of Homeland Security, and this co-varies with 
the increase in apprehensions (DHS 2018: 48). 
 
In recent years, Europe has seen a large increase in the number of illegal border 
crossings (see Section I) and responded with a mix of different policies. To stem the 
flows of illegal border crossings on the Eastern Mediterranean Route, the EU signed 
an agreement with Turkey that increased patrolling on the Turkish coast and 
introduced disincentives for those who were found to have been crossed illegally. 
Such an agreement came into force in March 2016. A preliminary assessment points 
to a marked decrease in the number of illegal border crossings across the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Figure 3).   
 
 




EU-Turkey agreement  
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Source: Elaboration on Frontex, Quartely Risk Assessments  
 
The agreement between Turkey and the EU came into force at the end of Q1-16. The 
following quarter shows a sharp decline in arrivals, both when compared to the 
previous quarter (-94.2 percent) and to Q2-15 (-87.1 percent). On average, between 
Q2-17 and Q1-17, this route registered a 95 percent decrease year-on-year. From 
2017 onwards, the level of crossings is in line with pre-2015 data (not presented in the 
figure). To assess to what extent this trend is attributable to the change in policy or to 
changes in the demand for smuggling services, for example the intensity of the 
conflict in Syria, will require further analysis.  
 
The Central Mediterranean presents a more complex – and rather challenging – policy 
environment. Between October 2013 and July 2017, the priority has been to rescue 
vessels and migrants through a series of vast search and rescue operations conducted 
by both States and NGOs in a context of very relaxed border controls. This started to 
change in July 2017 when restrictions to NGOs-led operations were introduced 
(ANSA 2017) and accelerated in June 2018 when a new right-wing government in 
Italy adopted a stricter so-called ‘closed ports’ policy (BBC 2018). The collapse of 
such government in August 2018 led to a new more left-leaning executive in 








Source: Elaboration on Italian Ministry of Interior  
 
The data from the Italian Ministry of Interior suggest that a hardening of the policy 
towards migration is consistent with a decrease in the number of individuals arriving 
in Italy (Figure 2). However, this preliminary assessment does not take into account 
changes in the demand for smuggling services, including the level of conflict in Libya 
and in other conflict zones such as Syria. Secondly, together with the changes in the 
Italian policy, there has been also changes at other stages along the migration route, 
notably Libya, where militias stopped protecting smuggler (see Section III above), 
and Niger, where the government outlawed many of the operators who had so far 
supplied ‘assisted’ migration services under pressure from the European Union 
(Brachet 2018; Raineri 2018).  
 
Amenta, Di Betta and Ferrara (2016) used official data on monthly illegal sea 
crossings into Italy between January 2011 and March 2016 to assess the effect of 
rescue operations on migrant smuggling. They found that military rescue operations at 
sea had increased the number of people crossings as well as the likelihood of success 
of the migrants’ journey. Their model controls for conflicts in both the migrants’ 
country of origin and in Libya, GDP per capita of the migrants’ country of origin, 
weather conditions at sea and reported deaths at sea. Rescue operations are estimated 
to have added an extra 4,130 departures/month. Deiana, Maheshri and Mastrobuoni 
(2019: 22) looked at the period 2009 – 2017 and also found an increase in illegal 
border crossings in periods when rescue operations were in place.  
 
What about the effect of rescue operations on reducing the risks for migrants? EPSC 
(2017: 2) offers an estimate for the number of migrants who died or went missing in 
the Central Mediterranean in the years 2011 – 2016. For the two years (2011-2012) 
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before the launch of the first large-scale rescue operation, Mare Nostrum (October 
2013), on average 1,052 individuals/year died or went missing. For the period 2014-
2016, such number went up to 3,536 individuals/year. This was mainly due to the 
increase in the number of departures. In relative terms, the mortality risk decreased 
following the launch of rescue operations. In 2011, such risk (deaths plus missing 
migrants) was 29 per 1,000 individuals who had successfully crossed the 
Mediterranean, and 21 per 1,000 in 2012. After the launch of the rescue operations, it 
went down to 18 per 1,000 in both 2014 and 2015.20 A very preliminary assessment 
thus suggests that, while in relative terms the rescue operations have been successful 
in saving lives, they have appeared not to have decreased the absolute number of 
deaths. More sophisticated models are certainly needed, but these are not so 
straightforward to specify (see Deiana, Maheshri and Mastrobuoni 2019: 37 for a 
more sophisticated approach and their warning about the difficulties in attributing 
causality; see also Steinhilper and Gruijters 2018: 526 on the same issue).  
 
The rescue operations in the Mediterranean have also highlighted the unintended 
consequences of ‘well-intentioned’ policies. The evidence for the year 2016 provides 
a good illustration. This was the year in which the budget, assets and area of operation 
of the multiple EU rescue operations had been massively expanded (EPSC 2017: 2-3). 
In addition, the same year saw the largest number of active NGO rescue vessels (9), 
and such vessels were operating as close to the Libyan coast as never before 
(sometimes within the Libyan territorial waters, EPSC 2017: 6, Figure 7). However, 
in the same year, the number of migrants who died or went missing at sea reached its 
highest level for entire period 2011 – 2016, and the mortality risk went up to 25 per 
1,000 (i.e., in line with the pre-2013 levels). This is likely to have been the 
consequence of a change in the smugglers’ modus operandi.  
 
There is evidence that, after the launch of large-scale rescue operations, smugglers 
started to provide migrants with a satellite phone and a GPS and one or more 
emergency contacts and instructed them to make direct contact with the Italian or 
Maltese authorities, or to merchant ships, in order to be rescued (Optimity Advisor 
2015: 39). Additionally – and crucially – smugglers also decreased the size of the 
boats used as the expected length of the journey decreased as rescue teams started to 
operate closer to the Libyan territorial waters: Altai Consulting 2015: 91; EPSC 
2017).21 Further, there is evidence that smugglers also changed the type of vessels 
                                               
20 For 2013, the mortality risk is 15 per 1,000 successful crossings, and the absolute 
number of deaths and missing migrants 644 (EPSC 2017: 2).  
21 There is further evidence of smugglers reacting strategically to their environment: 
for example, when the crossing from Calais, France, to Dover, United Kingdom, 
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they employed, switching from steadier – but more expensive – fishing boats and 
decommissioned commercial vessels to cheaper – but more dangerous – rubber 
dinghies (EPSC 2017: 7). Finally, smugglers decided not to board/pilot such boats, 
but let migrants be in command of their own boat (EPSC 2017: 7). Overall, the 
evidence from the Central Mediterranean shows that smugglers possess the ability to 
(quickly) respond and adapt to policy changes, and this in turn can generate 
unintended – yet pernicious – consequences.  
 
More generally, policies to tackle smuggling pose a host of moral dilemmas as they 
often imply difficult trade-offs between protecting the right of a state to control the 
movement of people across its borders and curbing illegal markets while at the same 
time protecting the lives and welfare of migrants as well as the right of individuals to 
seek asylum. As already noted, rescue operations at sea are likely to reduce mortality 
rate while at the same time increasing the number of individuals crossing and the size 
of the smuggling markets, ultimately increasing the profit for smugglers (Amenta, Di 
Betta and Ferrara 2016). Heightened border controls are likely to increase 
apprehension rates, but are also likely to exacerbate the dangers and risks faced by 
migrants (Slack and Martinez 2018: 171). More patrolling will increase the prices 
paid by migrants, but also decrease the quality of the smuggling services rendered: as 
observed by Slack and Martinez (2018) in the case of Mexico, smugglers are less and 
less willing to walk with migrants for fear of arrest and harsh penalties and, as a 
consequence, migrants are more likely to get lost and die when crossing treacherous 
areas. Similarly, smugglers operating across the Mediterranean responded to the 
increased likelihood to be detected and convicted by avoiding boarding the boats 
themselves and instead training migrants on how to do it on their own (Optimity 
Advisors 2015). Stopping treacherous crossings across the desert or the 
Mediterranean sea might involve restricting the right of people to move on land – like 
in the case of Niger – or, indeed, the right of people to have their asylum claims 
processed in a ‘safe country’.  
 
While the focus of this paper has been on the relationship between border controls 
and smuggling operations, more work is also needed to understand the impact of 
broader changes in migration policies on the demand for smuggling services, e.g. the 
availability of safe and legal migration channels, as well as opportunities for 
economic development in countries of origin. While these policies have an impact on 
the smuggling operations by increasing (decreasing) the demand for smuggling 
                                               
started to become less and less viable due to heightened control, some smugglers 
switched to Hoek van Holland, in the Netherlands (Optimity Advisors 2015: 33).  
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services – and thus they can offer alternative ways to curb such market – they remain 
outside the scope of this work.  
 
 
VI. Conclusions  
 
This essay has explored human smuggling interpreted as a form of illegal trade in 
which the commodity traded is an assisted illegal entry into a country. While there 
exists a widely agreed international legal definition of human smuggling, following 
the 2000 UN Protocol, our empirical knowledge about the phenomenon remains very 
patchy. There is no global estimate of the extent of smuggling and only a tiny 
minority of countries around the World produces statistics that can be used – directly 
or indirectly – to assess the phenomenon.  
 
An analysis of some of the main smuggling routes across the World has pointed to 
very similar organizational arrangements. Firstly, smuggling is not a monopolized 
business. This holds true for all the routes analyzed, from smuggling out of China to 
assisted irregular movements into Europe via both Turkey and North Africa as well as 
smuggling across the US-Mexico border. Secondly, the smuggling market is 
described as being populated by “decentralized associations of criminals” (Chinese 
smuggling: Zhang and Chin 2002: 759), “small, local and flexible organizations” 
(routes across Turkey: Icduygu and Toktas 2002: 46) and “localized and rather 
rudimentary hierarchies” (smuggling into Europe from North Africa: Campana 2018). 
In all the instances considered, the markets and organizations we observe are a far cry 
from the sophisticated, hierarchical Mafia model. What explains the remarkable 
similarities in the market for smuggling services across so many – and different – 
settings? And what explains the features we observe? I would argue that the answer to 
both lies in the nature of human smuggling as a commodity. At least four 
characteristics come to mind, and they are hardly context-specific. Firstly, smuggling 
services can be supplied without the need for large investments in capital and 
resources: if the level of investment required is low, also individuals and small-scale 
enterprises can afford to be in this business. Secondly, there are limited economies of 
scale to be achieved by internalising activities as smuggling remains a rather low-
technology and labour-intensive business. Thirdly, the high (prohibitive?) cost of 
monitoring agents (as well as migrants) over long distances creates strong incentives 
for smuggling organizations to remain localized. Finally, it is also likely that 
smugglers possess a rather short-time horizon. While there is no evidence available on 
smugglers’ careers, the presence of (steep) fluctuations in the flows suggests that 
smuggling might not be a long-term endeavour. This resonates with the limited 
empirical evidence on the profile of smugglers, which suggests that they tend to run 
legitimate businesses besides smuggling. 
 
At the same time, smugglers do not tend to be involved in other criminal activities. 
More than “hardened criminals” dealing with multiple illegal commodities, smugglers 
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are closer to legitimate small-scale entrepreneurs. Crucially, the evidence from the 
US-Mexico route, one of the major routes for both migrant smuggling and drug 
trafficking, strongly points to a separation between the two markets both in terms of 
actors and often also in terms of routes.  
 
Further, there is very little evidence of a direct involvement of traditional Mafia-like 
organizations in human smuggling. Smuggling remains separate from the activities of 
such organizations. In some areas, like Mexico, Libya or Niger, smugglers have to 
pay a protection fee for the right to operate. In Mexico, this derecho de piso is paid to 
local drug trafficking organizations while in Niger it is paid to local police officers. In 
Libya, it has been imposed by local militias until mid-2017 when some militias 
switched from protecting smugglers to stopping them (this is likely to have 
contributed to a large decline in sea crossings out of Libya). There is a clear 
separation between smugglers and protectors, much in line with that predicted by 
Schelling (1971) and Reuter (1983; 1985).  
 
Why traditional Mafia-like organizations seem not to have direct involvement in the 
smuggling business remains a puzzle. I would offer here a list of potential factors. 
Firstly, Mafias may possess a set of resources, e.g. access to violence, that are of little 
use in the case of human smuggling (the use of violence among smugglers is very 
limited). On the contrary, they tend not to possess crucial resources such as the ability 
to speak the same language of migrants, i.e. the demand-side of the market, and more 
crucially the capacity to build a reputation among migrants as well as in the 
communities from which they originate. Evidence has shown that both are key factors 
in the smuggling market. As a consequence, traditional Mafias could just be at a 
considerable disadvantage in tapping into the demand for smuggling services.  
 
Further, Mafias tend to be “heavily dependent on the local environment” (Gambetta 
1993: 251) and show little ‘territorial flexibility’. On the contrary, smugglers might 
need to move their operations – by choice or by force – and thus require a higher 
degree of territorial flexibility (for some preliminary evidence, see Campana 2017). 
However, relocating their business even to a nearby city could prove problematic for 
a Mafia organization.22  
 
Human smuggling appears to be characterised by a degree of competition in attracting 
migrants – similar to many legal markets. However, smugglers operate in a context of 
illegality which prevents the establishment of formal mechanisms to solve disputes, 
ensure compliance and enforce contracts, as well as acute information asymmetries. 
                                               
22 In addition, local factors can also be at play in specific settings. For example, in the 
case of Sicily, some smuggling agreements were made inside the reception centres, 
which are under round-the-clock surveillance from the police – a difficult 
environment for the Mafia to operate in.  
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Smugglers have devised strategies to overcome the trust problem and foster 
transactions, including investing in a positive reputation. Smugglers might go to great 
lengths in their attempt to build and protect their reputation, including paying 
compensations in case of incidents as well as investing in their image. Reputation has 
been shown to play a key role both at the community-level as well as, for some 
routes, in the online presence of smugglers. As reputations do not travel easily (Reuter 
1985), it is not surprising that smugglers and migrants tend to share the same ethnic 
background—often even sharing the same place of origin.  
 
Recent developments in information technology have led smugglers to make use of 
the opportunities offered by social media and the Internet to advertise their services 
and build their reputation. Other mechanisms that smugglers have developed are in 
the form of “multiple-attempts” warranties, giving migrants the ‘right’ to re-attempt a 
crossing if they were unable to reach the agreed destination as well as bringing in a 
third-party (“escrow service”) that is entrusted with holding the payment due to the 
smuggler until the migrant has safely reached the agreed destination.  
 
This is not to say that migrants might not face risky situations and violence or, indeed, 
that smugglers always act in a reliable and honest way. According to IOM, between 
2014 and 2019, 5,579 migrants have lost their lives on average each year. And many 
more are likely to have been victim of abuse or exploitation: 6% of the 655 migrants 
surveyed in Mexico declared to have been held by smugglers following a steep 
increase in the the originally-agreed fee or by individuals posing as smugglers; 1 out 
of 3 migrants who have crossed through Libya declared to have been forced to work 
or performed activities against their will (based on 1,602 migrants interviewed in Italy 
by IOM). Furthermore, the cost of smuggling services can place migrants in a debt 
situation, thus making them vulnerable to accept exploitative working conditions 
during or after the journey.   
 
A very limited number of studies has looked at the impact of changes in policies on 
the dynamics of human smuggling. The scant evidence suggests that an increase in 
enforcement at the US-Mexico border has led to an increase in the use of smugglers 
and a displacement towards riskier routes of passage, alongside a modest increase in 
the likelihood of apprehension at the border. Furthermore, smugglers appear to have 
responded to an increase in patrolling with an increase in the fee charged to migrants 
(Massey, Durand and Pren 2016). Some preliminary evidence from Europe suggests 
that the hardening of policies towards illegal movement is consistent with a decrease 
in the number of people crossing the sea into both Italy and Greece. The case of 
rescue operations carried out in the Mediterranean Sea points to a difficult moral 
dilemma, as they appear to increase the number of people successfully crossing into 
Italy (and consequently increasing the smugglers’ earnings) while at the same time 
reducing the mortality risk at sea (but not the absolute number of fatalities). Overall, 
the evidence suggests that heightened border controls are likely to increase 
apprehension rates and prices (thus potentially reducing demand) but also decrease 
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the quality of the service rendered by smugglers and exacerbate the dangers and risks 
faced by migrants. This generates a difficult trade-off between minimizing harm to 
migrants and enforcing the right of States to set and enforce their immigration rules – 
and thus creating a host of very difficult moral dilemmas.  
 
Looking ahead, I would suggest at least three areas in relation to which it would be 
greatly beneficial to collect further evidence (besides, of course, continuing the efforts 
in documenting fatalities and missing migrants). Firstly, more data on smugglers’ 
profiles is certainly needed, including their background, socio-demographic 
characteristics and criminal records. The evidence on smugglers’ criminal careers is 
almost non-existent, and more could be done to collect such evidence both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.  
 
Secondly, more could be done to study changes in smuggling markets. For example, 
what is the extent of displacement effects caused by policy changes? What is the 
geographical extent of smugglers’ movement if they need to relocate? What are the 
difficulties in relocating a smuggling business? Very little is know about the 
movement of smugglers and their response to changes in policies as well as demand. 
Equally, very little is known about smugglers’ behavior in response to a (steep) 
decrease in the market size. For example, what happened to the smugglers based in 
Libya following the shrinking of their market? Why smugglers do not appear to resort 
to violence to keep out competitors, particularly in a dwindling market? Any why are 
smuggling markets generally characterised by a low level of violence? 
 
Finally, more evidence could be collected on the interactions between smugglers and 
migrants, particularly around the latter’s decision-making, information-seeking and 
the role of reputation. Additional quantitative, large-scale, surveys with migrants 
could provide much-needed systematic insights into the interactions between demand-
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